the ideological limits of liberal democracy: the tendency to reduce political crisis to psychological malfunction

liberal democracy reduces politics to the axis of moral choices and "right ideas" by detaching it from material power relations. it attributes the roots of social problems to individuals' wrong ways of thinking rather than relations of production, class balances, and the form of the state. while this approach theoretically confines the debate to an epistemological realm, that is, the question of "how we should think," in practice, it turns politics into a morality lesson. ultimately, public debate is often squeezed into issues such as the correctness of language, the politeness of tone, or the dosage of criticism. in such a framework, political criticisms are frequently shifted to a psychological dimension. harshness, anger, or the use of "extreme" language is removed from being a symptom of a structural crisis and tied to an individual fear of "learning" or "thinking." however, what lies there is not a purely psychological tendency, but a deep political crisis. instead of confronting the content and truth of the criticisms, reducing them to a state of mind or personality traits is one of the most effective ways to neutralize political debate. it is appropriate to remember the expression marx used for political economists: appearance and reality are constantly confused. this confusion often stems not from bad intentions, but from habits of thinking that have become established in specific material conditions. over time, these habits become naturalized and turn into intentions. once settled, the state of ignoring the truth can lead to intellectual blindness, and even moral deviations. in turkey, for many years, democracy was associated with institutions, procedures, and the use of "correct language." it was assumed that politics would improve with the circulation of the right concepts. yet, this framework simultaneously formed the ideological ground for a large-scale transfer of power and class restructuring. approaches questioning this imagination were not given a real space for debate. texts that did not fit the paradigm of liberal values were systematically excluded; as criticism gained theoretical depth, the famous "politeness" quickly gave way to intolerance. this situation leads to an intellectual tension. someone who wants to develop new ideas and form their own sentences encounters a "democratic debate" ground whose boundaries have been drawn from the start. those who reject this framework are automatically pushed out of the debate. although the resulting tension appears on the surface as a lack of democracy, it stems from ignoring that the liberal imagination produces justifications for capitalist material structures. democracy, in this framework, becomes a category practically inaccessible to the vast majority of society; because it is fundamentally class-based. as channels of expression are blocked, words become harsher, anger accumulates. this is the natural result of the structural tension of politics. liberal discourse, on the other hand, presents promises that will reinforce the chains of capitalism while the system is functioning as "politics"; in times of crisis, when class contradictions surface, it tends to explain these with the "current state of consciousness" or an individual lack of conscience. the former is the expression of a theoretical bottleneck, the latter of a practical bottleneck. this process operates not through crude authoritarianism, but through a subtle and "democratized" manipulation. taking advantage of the weakness in the normative intellectual equipment of the other party, it skillfully directs and always leaves a gray area where it can say "part of the fault is yours." however, knowledge and experience are not the monopoly of any group. even if a person does not know all the intricacies of thought, they notice and know many things through their lived experiences. the current crisis of liberalism lies not in thought, but in the fear it feels of thought exceeding its own limits. this is why it takes refuge in psychologism in theory and moralism in practice. historically, the reactionism of the bourgeoisie was registered with the 1848 revolutions; the fate of liberal institutions became evident in the anti-bolshevik hysteria after world war i. liberals, after a brief hesitation, became the anti-communist defenders of the imperialist order. it is no coincidence that even in moments of crisis today, they return to the same cold war reflexes. because the issue is no longer thinking, but protecting the boundaries of thought. liberalism fears thought exceeding its own boundaries. this fear only becomes more pronounced in times of crisis.