war: the calculus of irrationality

the paradox of war: why do we keep choosing destruction?

war is stupid.

this is not a moral argument. it is a statement of fact, derived from the long arc of history. we know this, yet we continue waging war, justifying it through the cold language of strategy, necessity, security. but if war is about rational calculation, why do aggressors so often lose? why do states persistently miscalculate, plunging themselves into conflicts they cannot win? more provocatively: if war is truly about power, why does it so frequently lead to the downfall of the very rulers who initiate it?

this is the paradox of war. despite its supposed instrumental rationality, it is overwhelmingly self-destructive. yet it endures—not just as a practical tool of statecraft, but as a deeply ingrained cultural and ideological structure. we fight not only because we must, but because we believe we should. and it is precisely this fusion of material interest, ideology, and emotion that turns war into a machine of perpetual irrationality.

let’s break this apart.

the false promise of realism

war’s dominant intellectual justification comes from the realist school of international relations. states, we are told, are rational actors operating in an anarchic world. there is no higher authority to enforce peace, so states must maximize power to ensure survival. when states go to war, it is not due to impulse or ideology but careful calculation of risks and rewards.

but history suggests otherwise. take this simple test: do aggressors actually win their wars? over the past five centuries, the majority of states that have initiated major wars have lost. the more ambitious the goal, the more catastrophic the failure. napoleon, the kaiser, hitler, imperial japan, the soviet union in afghanistan, the united states in vietnam, russia in ukraine—all saw their wars backfire. if war were truly a rational act, wouldn’t those who started them have fared better?

the problem is that realism assumes rational decision-making under conditions that rarely exist. war is never a cold, mechanical calculation of costs and benefits. rather, it is fueled by overconfidence, ideological delusion, and emotional fervor. leaders don’t simply weigh material interests—they act out of fear, pride, and the seductive belief in their own historical destiny.

realism’s other major flaw is its emphasis on survival. states, we are told, will do whatever it takes to avoid destruction. yet history is littered with regimes that have willingly marched towards their own doom. the german empire in world war i, the japanese military junta in world war ii, and russia today—each chose escalation even when the odds were stacked against them. why? because war, for many rulers, is not about mere survival. it is about legacy, honor, and ideological purity. rationality be damned.

the irrational psychology of war

if rationality cannot explain war, what can? the answer lies in human psychology—specifically, in three recurring patterns that shape how rulers make decisions:

1. overconfidence and delusion: leaders routinely overestimate their own power and underestimate their enemies. putin’s invasion of ukraine, for example, was predicated on the belief that ukraine would collapse within days. instead, russia has found itself bogged down in an unwinnable war, hemorrhaging resources and credibility. the same pattern played out in the vietnam war, where american policymakers genuinely believed that superior firepower would break the will of the viet cong. they were catastrophically wrong.
2. the emotional pull of war: leaders do not simply calculate costs; they feel them. wars are often launched not because they make strategic sense, but because they satisfy deeper emotional needs—revenge, humiliation, wounded pride. world war i was not inevitable; it was driven by a cascade of escalating insults, nationalist fervor, and a pathological fear of appearing weak. today, israel’s assault on gaza is not merely about security—it is fueled by collective trauma and the ideological imperative to never again be vulnerable.
3. ideology as self-fulfilling prophecy: perhaps the most dangerous force behind war is the belief that conflict is inevitable. when states define themselves in opposition to an existential enemy, they manufacture the very wars they claim to be defending against. the cold war thrived on this logic: american leaders saw communism as a global existential threat, leading to a series of disastrous interventions in vietnam, central america, and afghanistan. yet their actions only reinforced soviet paranoia, perpetuating the very hostility they sought to contain.

power, ideology, and the structure of war

there is another reason war persists: it is baked into the structure of global politics. despite its irrationality, war continues because it serves certain institutional and ideological functions.

1. war as an elite survival strategy: while war often weakens states, it can strengthen individual rulers. authoritarians and weak leaders frequently use war to consolidate power, silence dissent, and rally nationalist sentiment. putin’s war in ukraine is a textbook example: facing declining domestic legitimacy, he manufactured an external crisis to justify repression at home.
2. the economic logic of war: while war rarely benefits entire societies, it does enrich certain actors—arms manufacturers, military contractors, and energy industries. the united states’ post-9/11 wars cost trillions of dollars, yet they created a lucrative defense industry that continues to wield enormous political influence. as long as war remains profitable for the few, it will remain a policy option for the many.
3. war as a cultural institution: beyond material interests, war persists because it is embedded in national myths. every empire, from rome to america, has justified its wars as necessary, noble, and even moral. this is why each generation repeats the same mistakes—because we are conditioned to see war not as a failure of politics, but as its ultimate expression.

rethinking war: is peace the anomaly?

if war is so irrational, why is peace so rare? perhaps we have been asking the wrong question. rather than seeing war as a breakdown of order, we should recognize it as the default condition of power.

war endures because it is not merely a tool of statecraft; it is a system of social organization. it shapes economies, legitimizes rulers, and reinforces collective identities. states exist in part to wage war—whether against external enemies or internal dissent.

if we truly wish to escape war, we must do more than condemn it. we must dismantle the institutions that perpetuate it. this means confronting not just militarism, but the entire ideological edifice that sustains it: nationalism, security paranoia, and the glorification of violence as a legitimate political tool.

this is no easy task. but until we recognize that war is less about rational calculation and more about structural compulsion, we will continue to march, blindly and obediently, into the abyss.

reference:

this text is influenced by michael mann, “explaining the irrationality of war,” new left review 145, january-february 2024.